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**Summary** Costco’s annual membership fees are not “magic money” that lets it sell merchandise at a loss. Breaking its fiscal 2026 disclosures into merchandise gross profit, selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A), and membership fees shows that membership plays an important role in profit. Vast merchandise sales and efficient operations are also essential. This article traces the links between sourcing a limited selection, repeat shopping and renewals, and the fees customers pay. It distinguishes what the numbers show from FORWARD BASIS’s interpretation, then examines which elements other businesses can and cannot replicate.
Why do customers pay to enter a store they choose for low prices?
Pay upfront just to enter a store. At an ordinary supermarket, that would seem odd. At Costco, a membership warehouse retailer, it is the starting point of the shopping experience. Its fiscal 2026 disclosures put the annual fee for a US Gold Star member at $65. Executive members pay $130 a year and generally receive a 2% reward on qualifying purchases, subject to conditions.[1][3]
What, then, are customers buying? “The right to enter the store” is formally correct. In practice, the answer is more complex. Customers pay for the prospect of getting more value than their membership fee through a year’s shopping. If the store cannot deliver that value, they will not renew. Membership is therefore more than a one-time sale: it is a contract whose value is reassessed the following year.
A distinction matters here: paying a membership fee and getting low merchandise prices are separate facts. Charging a fee does not guarantee low prices. Connecting fees to pricing requires looking at procurement, inventory, logistics, labor costs, and customer purchasing behavior together. This article tests a familiar explanation against the financial results: “Costco makes its money from membership fees, so it can sell merchandise at almost no profit.”
A one-line earnings equation clarifies the role of membership fees
Costco’s fiscal 2026 covers the 52 weeks from September 1, 2025, to August 30, 2026. Its Form 10-K filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission reports revenue, merchandise costs, membership fee revenue, and SG&A.[1] Expressed consistently in millions of US dollars, the core business breaks down as follows.
| Fiscal 2026 item | Amount (US$ millions) | What it means | |---|---:|---| | Net sales of merchandise and related operations | 297,247 | Revenue from merchandise and related operations | | Merchandise costs | 264,279 | Cost of merchandise sold | | Merchandise gross profit | 32,968 | Net sales − merchandise costs | | Membership fee revenue | 5,907 | Membership revenue reported separately | | Selling, general and administrative expenses | 27,190 | Store operations, labor costs, and other expenses | | Operating profit | 11,685 | Merchandise gross profit + membership fee revenue − SG&A |
The accounting relationship in this table is **32,968 + 5,907 − 27,190 = 11,685**. Both merchandise gross profit and membership fee revenue help cover operating expenses.[1] The merchandise gross margin is 32,968 ÷ 297,247, or approximately 11.09%. This is the margin after deducting merchandise costs, not the company’s final net profit margin. Net profit in fiscal 2026 was $9,226 million.[1][2]
Membership fee revenue of $5,907 million is equivalent to approximately 50.6% of operating profit of $11,685 million. That is a striking comparison, but it does not mean that “membership fees alone generated half of operating profit.” The comparison is between a revenue item and operating profit. It cannot disentangle the interaction through which membership attracts customers who then buy merchandise. A calculation assuming that fees disappear while merchandise sales remain unchanged rests on an assumption unlikely to hold in practice. It must be distinguished from the causal effect on the business.
The more important fact is that **neither merchandise gross profit nor membership fees alone can explain this operating profit**. Treating membership fees as the source of all profit overlooks $32,968 million in merchandise gross profit. Focusing only on merchandise gross profit misses the financial cushion that $5,907 million in membership fees provides across the operation. The starting point is to consider both together.
The weakness in the claim that membership fees subsidize low prices
Membership fees may create room to sell merchandise at lower prices. Recurring revenue from members can make it easier to balance prices and purchase volumes without seeking the highest possible margin on every item. But this is a hypothesis about the options available to management. Disclosures alone do not reveal how many dollars of membership fee revenue went toward price cuts.
First, even when annual membership fees are collected upfront, they are generally recognized as revenue over the membership period. At the end of fiscal 2026, the balance sheet recorded $3,006 million in deferred membership fee revenue, covering unexpired membership periods and related items.[1] Cash received at the start of the year cannot all be treated as profit immediately.
Second, pricing faces constraints beyond procurement costs. Warehouse rent and maintenance, staffing, delivery, and equipment all cost money, even when the profit on an individual item is thin. The claim that membership fees allow every product to be sold at a loss leaves unexplained what covers annual selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A) of $27.19 billion.
Third, a membership fee increase warrants caution about assuming that the extra revenue translates directly into a permanent increase in profit. New memberships, renewals, upgrades, and existing members’ spending may all shift together. Costco attributes its roughly 11% year-over-year increase in membership fee revenue in fiscal 2026 to new memberships, fee changes, and upgrades to Executive membership. It says the fee increase introduced in the US and Canada in September 2024 accounted for about 30% of the increase in membership fee revenue in fiscal 2026.[1] Attributing all that revenue growth to membership’s growing popularity would be a mistake.
Does a limited assortment merely inconvenience customers?
Costco discloses that its core warehouses carry fewer than 4,000 SKUs at any given time. A SKU is a unit used to track inventory; different colors or specifications of the same product may count as separate SKUs. Online, it carries an average of 9,000–11,000 SKUs.[1] Offering less variety than a typical general retailer is a business choice, rather than simply a weakness in its assortment.
Imagine one store offering a dozen or more similar products in the same category, and another buying a narrower selection of leading products in bulk. The latter can more easily consolidate orders for each item and simplify replenishment and storage. It may also be easier to consolidate purchasing terms with suppliers. This describes an economic mechanism; it does not mean Costco’s purchase prices for individual items are publicly available.
Warehouse operations are linked to this choice. Costco identifies displaying merchandise on pallets, storing it on overhead racks, and keeping relatively short opening hours as sources of efficiency. The company also says that controlling entrances and exits helps limit merchandise losses.[1] Reducing variety is one part of the approach. Designing the sales floor, replenishment, inventory, and staffing around the same objectives creates room to operate at a low gross margin.
Of course, narrowing the assortment means forgoing sales of products the store does not carry. This disadvantages households whose preferences do not match the selection, or customers who place a high value on choosing individual items. Unless the limited selection appeals to many customers and demand forecasts are precise, bulk purchasing can also lead to excess inventory. Fewer varieties therefore mean greater efficiency only under certain conditions.
Inventory turnover and supplier payment terms support price competitiveness
Even cheaply sourced merchandise ties up cash if it sits unsold for too long. A long wait for payment after a sale strains cash flow. A retailer’s competitiveness depends on more than merchandise margins. It also depends on **the cash tied up in inventory and the time it takes for that cash to return**.
In fiscal 2026, Costco’s cash flow from operating activities rose to $15,817 million from $13,335 million the previous fiscal year. The company attributed the increase to higher operating profit and lower net investment in merchandise inventory, reflecting improved inventory turnover and supplier payment terms.[1] This can be read as an example of working capital efficiency contributing to financial performance alongside high sales volume.
At the end of fiscal 2026, Costco’s balance sheet showed merchandise inventory of $19,324 million and accounts payable of $22,591 million.[1] Comparing these two balances alone does not establish that Costco can freely use suppliers’ money or that its overall working capital is always negative. Understanding the full cash cycle requires examining seasonality, payment deadlines, and other receivables and payables. The evidence here supports only the narrower point: Costco itself identifies improved inventory turnover and payment terms as contributors to higher cash flow.
Simply copying bulk procurement is not enough. If a business with substantial unsold inventory merely increases order volumes, it will lose more gross profit through markdowns and incur higher warehousing costs. Scale delivers economic benefits only when the ability to buy in bulk is matched by the ability to sell quickly. Assessing procurement strength therefore requires considering unit prices, inventory turnover, and the cash tied up in stock together.
For members, value goes beyond the receipt
From a customer’s perspective, low merchandise prices do not necessarily mean good value if membership fees are high. Traveling long distances, navigating crowded stores, storing large quantities of food at home, and discarding what cannot be used all impose costs absent from price tags. This article does not claim that Costco offers the lowest prices for every household.
Put simply, the economic case for membership depends on whether annual savings against alternative stores offering equivalent quality, plus the value of fuel and other services, exceed the costs. Those costs include membership fees, travel and time, storage, waste, and unnecessary additional purchases. FORWARD BASIS constructed this inequality for analytical purposes; it is not an official Costco formula.
The same $65 annual membership fee means something different to a household that shops there 20 times a year than to one that visits only 2 times. Still, 20 visits do not guarantee savings. Savings vary with what members buy, which stores they compare against, and how they travel. Membership encourages repeat visits, but infrequent shoppers may feel they have lost money. At renewal, both the store and the customer need to assess the actual value delivered over the year.
Viewed this way, Costco’s ancillary services, including gas stations, pharmacies, and food courts, may add reasons to visit beyond the revenue they generate individually. At the end of fiscal 2026, Costco had 774 gas stations, and its gasoline business accounted for 11% of net sales.[1] However, no member-level causal data could be identified showing how many percentage points gasoline added to the renewal rate. Increasing opportunities to visit and demonstrating the size of that effect are separate matters.
What the 89.8% global renewal rate proves—and what it does not
At the end of fiscal 2026, renewal rates were 92.3% in the US and Canada and 89.8% worldwide. Costco had 84.10 million paid members and 150.40 million cardholders, including household cards.[1] Viewed alone, these figures suggest a business with very strong retention.
However, the renewal rate does not mean that 89.8% of members registered at that point had committed to another year. Costco uses a retrospective calculation reflecting renewals 7–18 months before the reporting date. Memberships that expired in the final 6 months before the reporting period ended are excluded, regardless of whether the members renewed. This allows for members who renew late.[1] Comparing the figure with other companies’ cancellation rates without understanding the measurement window can be misleading.
The paid membership count also includes a small number of members whose memberships expired within the past 12 months and who have yet to renew.[1] It is therefore not a count of current users. For example, it cannot distinguish between a member who visits every week and one who visits only once a year. Combining data with different units of measurement can produce a plausible but inaccurate picture of the “average customer.”
Nor can the high renewal rate be attributed to a single cause. Price, quality, location, product selection, family routines, gasoline, refund services, and other factors may all play a role. Paying membership fees upfront may also make members reluctant to let that money go to waste. These financial results alone, however, cannot establish that effect. High retention is an observed outcome; it does not establish the causal effect of a particular strategy.
Do Executive members buy more because they upgraded?
At the end of fiscal 2026, Costco had 42.30 million Executive members, equivalent to about 50.3% of its 84.10 million disclosed paid members. Executive members accounted for approximately 75.2% of worldwide net sales.[1] They clearly account for a large share of purchases, but there is a pitfall here.
It would be premature to conclude that upgrading members increases their spending. Members who already buy more are more likely to weigh the additional membership fees against the rewards and choose the higher tier. Conversely, some may shop more after upgrading. The disclosed aggregate figures cannot distinguish between these two patterns. In causal inference, this is the problem of self-selection.
Executive members generally earn rewards of 2% on eligible purchases, subject to a cap. The company disclosed that these rewards reduced net sales by $3,383 million in fiscal 2026.[1] The proportion of Executive members thus has implications beyond membership fee revenue: it also entails the cost of rewards on merchandise purchases. These disclosures do not support the conclusion that increasing Executive membership necessarily raises margins.
A better assessment would require comparing groups of members with similar purchase frequencies and spending before upgrading, then tracking subsequent differences. The published financial results do not allow that analysis, so this article concludes only that Executive membership is “associated with high levels of use.” Understanding what the figures cannot establish is more useful for decision-making than praising their size.
Core business strength alone does not explain revenue growth in 2026
Net sales rose approximately 10% year over year in fiscal 2026. Comparable sales at existing stores increased approximately 8%. The company attributed this to increases of approximately 5% in average spending per visit and approximately 3% in shopping frequency.[1] The store count also increased by a net 25. These figures suggest that customers responded favorably to the merchandise, but they do not establish that customer numbers grew without price increases.
Higher gasoline prices lifted net sales by approximately $3,501 million, while currency movements added approximately $1,332 million. Excluding gasoline price and currency effects, company-wide comparable sales grew 7%.[1] Growth in nominal revenue should not be attributed solely to higher merchandise volume. This principle also matters when analyzing companies in other industries.
The merchandise gross margin fell 3 basis points, from 11.12% in fiscal 2025 to 11.09% in fiscal 2026. However, the company's supplementary analysis put it at 11.22% excluding the effect of higher gasoline prices, an increase of 10 basis points year over year.[1] These figures do not contradict each other. Gasoline prices fluctuate widely, and gasoline has a relatively low gross margin. Changes in its share of revenue therefore affect the company-wide margin. When the composition of the denominator changes, small movements in the margin alone cannot establish how well management has performed.
Sales through digital channels also deserve attention. The company reported that sales including transactions initiated on digital devices and travel services accounted for 11% of total net sales in fiscal 2026. Comparable sales through digital channels also increased 21%.[1] It is inaccurate to view Costco as a business that operates only through stores. However, these percentages alone do not provide enough information to assess gross profit from digital sales or isolate their contribution to membership renewals.
Four conditions that could undermine the low-price model
To understand a strength, consider the circumstances in which it could disappear. The first condition is a decline in procurement and logistics efficiency. A model built around a limited assortment and high inventory turnover can backfire if stockouts or demand forecasting errors persist. Bulk purchases may become a burden through storage and disposal costs before they can fund price cuts.
The second is a narrowing gap between the value members receive and what competitors offer. Superstores, specialty retailers, online retailers, and other membership warehouse clubs also compete on price and convenience. The company itself names Walmart, Target, Kroger, Amazon, and Sam's Club among its competitors.[1] If price differences narrow while the effort of getting to stores and membership fees remain unchanged, the economic case for renewal weakens.
The third is rising labor, land, and equipment costs. Even strong revenue cannot sustain growth unless enough profit remains. Capital expenditures totaled $6,435 million in fiscal 2026. Maintaining and expanding store and logistics networks requires capital.[1] Revenue growth should not be equated with an increase in cash available to spend.
The fourth is new stores taking customers from existing stores. The company discloses cannibalization of existing store sales as a risk of opening new locations.[1] More stores improve geographic convenience, but they may also reduce sales efficiency per store. Expansion cannot be assumed to strengthen competitiveness automatically.
These risks can be identified from the company's disclosures and the underlying economic mechanisms; they do not amount to a claim that current performance is deteriorating. Examining counter-evidence is not intended to deny success. Its purpose is to identify which conditions must persist for an explanation of success to remain valid, and which changes would require that explanation to be revised.
Membership fees rose, yet renewal rates held steady. What can we conclude?
Membership fees in the US and Canada rose in September 2024. In both fiscal 2025 and fiscal 2026, renewal rates were 92.3% in the US and Canada and 89.8% worldwide.[1][4] At first glance, this might suggest that customers stay even when membership fees rise. But these figures alone cannot establish how sensitive demand is to a price increase—in other words, its price elasticity.
Renewal rates are calculated over a specific window, and countries and membership composition differ. Over that period, merchandise prices, customer incomes, competitors' behavior and the share of digital sign-ups also change. We cannot simultaneously observe a world without the fee increase. Stable renewal rates therefore cannot serve as causal evidence that the increase did no harm.
Still, rising membership fee revenue alongside high renewal rates is an important observation for the company. When membership fees change, how many people join, how many stay, how does usage change, and how do customers perceive the financial burden? Evaluating a fee change requires tracking these measures together. Judging success by a single revenue metric can obscure problems that emerge at renewal the following year.
Master Insight: Costco sells more than low-priced goods—it sells a system that brings future repeat purchases together
Taken together, the facts examined so far suggest a way to describe Costco's competitive advantage through three cycles. This is FORWARD BASIS's interpretation, rather than a management model officially named by the company.
**The first is the operating cycle.** Limit the product range, buy in bulk, and make store operations and inventory management more efficient. If those efficiencies feed through to prices, customers have more reasons to shop. Concentrating sales volume can make it easier to secure favorable conditions for future procurement and inventory management. Both high sales volume and the ability to keep selecting products that sell are essential.
**The second is the membership cycle.** Customers pay membership fees annually and seek to recover that value over multiple shopping trips. If store prices and selection meet expectations, they continue shopping and renewing. Renewal provides recurring revenue for the company while also serving as a regular assessment of value by customers. However, a high renewal rate does not directly measure individual customer satisfaction.
**The third is the cash cycle.** When merchandise turns over quickly and supplier payment terms are favorable, less cash needs to be tied up in inventory. The resulting financial flexibility may support choices such as competitive pricing, store improvements and capital investment. The explanation of fiscal 2026 cash flow is consistent with part of this cycle. However, public figures alone cannot establish the magnitude of the specific causal effects.[1]
Copying membership fees in isolation from these three cycles merely reproduces the surface of the business. What matters is aligning value that draws customers back, low-cost operations that keep producing that value, and sales designed to keep cash from being tied up. If what Costco sells is called a membership, its substance is **a contract under which the company and its customers reassess each year the prospect of repeated future shopping**.
What can small companies and sole proprietors replicate first?
Costco's scale is not easy to reproduce. Small information services or e-commerce businesses cannot gain economies of scale in procurement or operations simply by combining annual fees with low prices. The first task is to establish the unit of value: what outcomes customers paying a flat fee receive, and when they receive them.
For an information publication, for example, define which decisions readers will be able to make better, rather than how many articles it publishes each month. If publishing more often raises production costs without changing paying members' usage frequency or satisfaction, flat-rate pricing does not solve the problem. In retail, look beyond whether reducing the product range improves ordering efficiency. Also examine changes in stockout rates, lost sales, waste and repeat purchases.
At a minimum, assessing a recurring business requires five measures: ① new customer acquisition tracked separately from renewals; ② usage and value received per member; ③ the variable and fixed costs of providing the offering; ④ profitability by usage frequency; and ⑤ dissatisfaction just before renewal and reasons for leaving. Membership growth alone does not reveal whether ongoing value has improved.
When considering a price increase, revenue in the month of the change must not be the sole measure of success. Track departures at renewal, plan changes, declining usage and the substance of complaints. Higher membership fees may lift revenue in the short term while causing damage to long-term relationships that emerges later. If collecting data is difficult, interviews with customers who use the service at different frequencies can be a starting point. Changes among your own customers may matter more for decisions than figures in publicly reported financial results.
The takeaway: What to ask before introducing membership to your business
Start with a final question: does your offering give customers value repeatedly over a year? If customers use it once and are done, recurring fees become a barrier. If usage frequency varies widely, usage-based pricing may be fairer and make more business sense than a flat annual membership fee.
Next, is there a sound basis for lowering prices? “We can charge membership fees, so we can lower prices” is not an answer. How can you deliver each unit of a product or service at consistent quality while using fewer resources? Costco provides concrete answers through its limited SKU range, inventory turnover, store operations, procurement, and connections to ancillary services.
And is membership structured so that customers renew because it is worth choosing each year, rather than because cancellation is difficult? A high renewal rate alone cannot establish that customers are better off. The central question is whether you give customers reasons to renew while preserving their freedom to leave.
The lesson from Costco’s fiscal 2026 financial results is less about the scale of membership fee revenue than **the danger of discussing membership fees, merchandise gross profit, and operating efficiency in isolation**. Low prices are only the starting point. What matters is whether the business has a system that can deliver those prices and that value again next year—and whether customers have reasons to choose it again. When both conditions hold year after year, membership evolves from a billing model into a competitive strategy.
SOURCE
Sources
These are the primary sources we used to check the facts. The article identifies our own analysis.
- Sourcehttps://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/909832/000090983226000093/cost-20260830.htm
- Sourcehttps://investor.costco.com/news/news-details/2026/Costco-Wholesale-Corporation-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Fiscal-Year-2026-Operating-Results/default.aspx
- Sourcehttps://customerservice.costco.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/857/
- Sourcehttps://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/909832/000090983225000101/cost-20250831.htm
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