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Our own choices feel “normal”
When choosing a movie with friends, someone picks a film and naturally expects the others to choose it too. But the conversation reveals different tastes: a friend favors a completely different film. The disagreement raises a question: is their own preference unusual, or is the friend the odd one?
This is not necessarily an unfounded assumption. If many people nearby share a person’s views, that choice may indeed be common. Researchers have also studied a tendency to systematically misjudge the proportions of other people’s choices depending on one’s own choice. This is the “false-consensus effect.”
In 1977, Lee Ross, David Greene, and Pamela House reported this effect in a paper covering 4 studies.[1] The findings showed a tendency for people to estimate that others were more likely to choose the option they themselves had chosen. People making the same choice appeared “normal.” Those choosing differently seemed to reveal distinctive aspects of their personalities or values.
The research did not show that everyone agreed
This is the first potential misunderstanding. The researchers did not examine whether everyone actually agreed. They compared **how common people predicted particular responses would be**, according to their own answers. Confusing actual proportions with predicted proportions reverses the meaning of the findings.
For example, in a hypothetical survey, people who answer “I want to spend the weekend at home” might estimate a higher proportion of others giving that answer. Conversely, those who want to go out might estimate a higher proportion preferring to go out. This is an illustrative example; it does not mean Ross and his colleagues used this weekend question in their research.
| Quantities to keep separate | What does each represent? | What happens if they are confused? |
|---|---|---|
| A person’s own choice | How that person answered | Their choice is mistaken for the actual majority choice |
| Predictions of others’ choices | The proportion the person expects to make a given choice | A prediction is mistaken for an opinion poll |
| Actual distribution of choices | The number of people making each choice in the group studied | The distribution is applied directly to a different group |
The paper’s abstract states that Ross and his colleagues studied both hypothetical situations presented in questionnaires and situations involving actual conflicts of opinion.[1] However, the size of the effect may vary with participants’ characteristics and the types of questions asked. It is not a universal rule that people always assume they are in the majority.
Why do people make these predictions?
One possibility is that the people someone regularly encounters resemble them. Friends and colleagues often overlap in age, interests, and circumstances. Drawing on that small sample may lead people to expect the same pattern across society. Another possibility is that people see the reasons for their own choice as obvious and assume others see the same conditions.
Neither explanation, however, can be established as a cause on the basis of a single study. Observing an association between people’s choices and their predictions cannot fully distinguish whether **their own choices changed their predictions** or similar environments changed both. Even when research finds an association, causation needs to be tested separately.
The tendency to see people with different views as odd is also troublesome. Attributing disagreement to personality without checking the other person’s circumstances can leave even people looking at the same material talking past one another. The sense that one is normal can sometimes lead to a conclusion before the other person’s explanation is heard.
Is the research too old to apply today?
If the evidence came only from the 1977 study, it would be natural to worry that results might change across times and places. FORRT’s Replication Atlas, which compiles replication studies, records the findings of the related multisite replication Many Labs 2 as consistent with a hypothesis: people’s own choices are positively associated with their estimates of the proportion of others who would make the same choice.[2] Finding one replication supports the original claim. It does not prove that the effect is the same size in every country, culture, and topic.
Indeed, putting this psychological insight into practice means avoiding the assumption that every group is the same. Friends may agree, while people at another school, in another region, or in another age group may think differently. In a survey, who is asked affects the accuracy of the estimate.
Three questions to try when opinions differ
Questioning an estimate does not mean blaming oneself by saying, “You’re wrong.” First, narrow the scope: “About how many people around me hold this view?” Then ask a separate question: “What proportion of people overall hold it?” Finally, ask: “What did those who disagree base their judgment on?” For numbers, consult a representative survey.
For example, even if three friends share a view, that alone cannot establish what the majority of the wider public thinks. The three friends really do agree. The question is how far that observation can be generalized.
FORWARD BASIS’s conclusion is to **question the estimate of how common one’s choice is, rather than the choice itself**. Agreement feels comfortable, but being surrounded by similar people makes it easy to misjudge how widespread that agreement is. Holding one’s own views is entirely compatible with avoiding the assumption that others must share them.
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